When George Bush Jr. made his first intimations that the US may again invade Iraq, this time to remove Saddam Hussein from power, the world raised a collective eyebrow. This certainly wasn’t a new idea (Clinton had previously intimated that if Iraq complied with every requirement then the US may still not lift sanctions), but many thought he was getting a little carried away with the war on terror. What then has changed in the Middle East political scene that would attract renewed ire from a line of US presidents? There are several possible strategic reasons that the US may want to take another look at in the region.

The secret of Saddam’s ambitions with regards to weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) was possibly the worst kept secret since Liberace’s “outing”. At the end of the Gulf War it was amply clear that Saddam had a far greater biological and chemical weapons program than was originally thought. Scarier still was the fact that he had proven his willingness to employ such weapons in the Iran conflict of the preceding decade. The continued frustration of the United Nations Weapons inspectors (UNSCOM) in being allowed to properly assess the scope of the program showed to the world that Saddam was not serious about complying with his obligations after the Gulf War ended. UNSCOM was evicted from Iraq in 1998.

Since the eviction of UNSCOM, there have been several Iraqi defectors more than willing to tell tales of Saddam’s renewed vigour in constructing WMDs. The problem in trusting such sources is their reliance on their stories to ensure their welcome as refugees to the West.

Nevertheless, whilst there is no sure way of knowing the exact capacity of Saddam’s chemical and biological arsenal, the likelihood that it has been amply increased is almost a certainty if the pre-1998 findings of UNSCOM are anything to go by. UNSCOM chairman, Richard Butler, at the time of eviction in 1998, was unwilling to give a declaration that Iraq’s capacity or willingness to produce WMDs had been negated, citing the unwillingness of the Iraqis to provide evidence of such. (The onus of proof was placed firmly on Iraq by the agreed-upon cease-fire terms in 1991.) Combined with unexplained instances of weaponised biological agents found in Iraq during UNSCOM’s stay, it would be a stretch to argue that Iraq had ceased its pursuits in this area since 1998.

The recalcitrance of Hussein’s regime also means that Iraq is in violation of at least eight Security Council resolutions according to Butler. International law also allows resolutions of the UN Security Council to be enforced. Allowing Saddam to continue to thumb his nose at the Security Council can only have detrimental repercussions for the legitimacy of that world body if they are allowed to continue in the medium- to long-term. This thought alone may sway the Security Council towards passing the required Enabling Resolution to legitimise any potential US invasion of Iraq. We can also be assured of continued US lobbying for this to happen.

Perhaps most worrying to the US is the growing popularity of Saddam with other countries of the Middle East. Last month’s exchange of POWs from the Iran-Iraq war of the 80s was enough to bring a tear to the eye of all but the most cynical humanitarians. George Bush’s Axis of Evil speech, citing both Iraq and Iran as offenders, probably also served to drive these two former enemies closer together. The last Arab summit also saw Iraq make overtones of reconciliation towards both Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, which was welcomed by the rest of the participants.

Whilst Iraq will probably not quite be receiving Christmas cards from either Saudi Arabia or Kuwait this year (for more than the obvious reason!) the path to reconciliation has certainly begun. Bush Jr. may indeed be losing some sleep over the possibility of an Arab world united in purpose, with Saddam pulling some of the strings. The thought of Saddam being able to turn off the Middle East oil taps (or at least have increased influence in this process) may also upset some of Bush’s buddies in certain companies that shall remain nameless. Yes, the dreaded cliché of oil again creeps into the equation.

Two other aspects of Middle East politics that will need immediate attention by the US if Bush is to attack Iraq are the Israeli-Palestinian situation and the threat of social unrest in Saudi Arabia. The worsening situation of the Palestinians will have a great effect on the level of Middle Eastern support that the US can expect in the event of an attack on Iraq. So too the situation in Saudi Arabia, which will surely worsen in the event of a US attack. Such could put a severe strain on the ability of the current Saudi administration to retain power.

Many armchair psychoanalysts may also want to take a crack at Saddam’s Hammurabi complex. Rather than digging up the archaeological sites of the great kingdom of Babylon, Saddam is ordering their reconstruction, complete with brick carrying his own inscriptions. Anyone with a sense of history in the Middle East will know this cannot be taken in a positive light by the region if they have any concern for their own security. Combined with Saddam’s past aggressive indiscretions against his neighbours, and continued rhetoric about a united Arab world, we may be excused for thinking we have a classic megalomaniac on our hands. (He also refused to meet with Richard Butler or Rolf Ekeus of UNSCOM at any point, as he considered it beneath his dignity – how medieval!) The short of it is that Saddam’s goals do not stop at the borders of Iraq.

Whilst no evidence has been found to link Iraq to the terrorist attacks of September 11, Saddam knows he is in the spotlight of the US. The continued sabre-rattling of Washington, combined with Saddam’s knowledge of his own guilt on the aforementioned points, has led to somewhat of a back flip on his part. Twelve years to the day after the invasion of Kuwait, Saddam has expressed his willingness to have UN weapons inspectors return to Iraq. Predictably, the US has rejected these overtures as a joke.

Only two things remain to explain Saddam’s change of heart. The first reason is that he obviously sees the US efforts in lobbying for support are beginning to have effect. Even Jordan seems to have taken a lighter view of a new attack on Iraq (they were neutral in 1991). Despite King Abdullah’s public anti-war rhetoric, he has allowed a small amount of US forces into Jordan to make preparations for the pending invasion. Saddam knows that most countries in the world cannot afford to support Iraq at the expense of offending the US. Secondly, he also knows the propensity of US presidents for launching attacks during periods of popularity slump. Bush is certainly in no trouble in that arena at the moment, but the support for his administration will wane and is already showing signs of such. Saddam would be aware of this and know that he has limited time to react.

The upshot of all of this is that the US administration may feel it is necessary to attack Iraq sooner rather than later. Iraq has an increasingly supported position in the Middle East that is beginning to infringe on the ability of the West to exert their influence over this strategically important region. Bush will continue to lobby for support in an attack on Iraq. If he is able to get this and it coincides with declining domestic approval, then the likelihood is that we will see the situation come to a head with the removal of Saddam. The strategic reasons are becoming apparent and the efforts of Washington are currently focused on modifying the individual situations that would inhibit the ability of a US attack. War in Iraq is imminent.